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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Marcos A. Renteria appeals from his judgment of conviction for trafficking in cocaine, 
entered on his conditional guilty plea.  On appeal, Renteria challenges the district court’s denial 
of his suppression motion. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
On June 2, 2016, Officer Sproat, with the Idaho State Police, pulled over Renteria for 
failing to signal for the statutorily required five seconds.  (Tr., p.40, L.21 – p.41, L.25; p.50, L.8 
– p.51, L.17.)  During the subsequent traffic stop, a certified drug-detection dog alerted to the 
presence of drugs in Renteria’s vehicle.  (Tr., p.131, L.4 – p.133, L.11; p.140, L.2 – p.141, L.15.)  
A subsequent search of the vehicle led to the discovery of approximately 501 grams of cocaine.  
(R., p.12.) 
In separate cases, the state charged Renteria with trafficking in cocaine and possession of 
cocaine.  (R., pp.28-29, 175-76.)  Pursuant to the state’s motion (R., pp.179-80), the cases were 
ultimately consolidated (R., p.193).  Renteria filed a motion to suppress the evidence acquired 
during the traffic stop.  (R., pp.66-67.)  The suppression motion was dismissed in the trafficking 
case for being untimely filed (R., p.92) and denied on the merits in the possession case (R., 
p.202; Tr., p.167, L.20 – p.168, L.11).  
After his suppression motion was, respectively, denied and dismissed, Renteria entered 
into a binding conditional plea agreement, under which he pleaded guilty to the trafficking 
charge, the possession charge was dismissed, and he reserved the right to appeal from the denial 
of his suppression motion.  (R., pp.213-18.)  Pursuant to the plea agreement, the district court 
entered a judgment of conviction against Renteria for trafficking in cocaine and sentenced him to 
 2 
a unified term of nine years with six years fixed.  (R., pp.127-28.)  Renteria filed timely notices 
of appeal.  (R., pp.129-32, 222-25.) 
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ISSUE 
Renteria states the issue on appeal as: 
 
 Whether the district court err [sic] in determining that Officer’s [sic] 
Sproat’s three deviations, not related to Mr. Renteria’s stop for failing to use his 
blinker, were not an unlawful extension of the stop such that Mr. Renteria’s 
Fourth Amendment rights were violated? 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p.7.) 
 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
 
 Has Renteria failed to show that the district court erred by denying his suppression 
motion? 
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ARGUMENT 
Renteria Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred When It Denied His Motion To 
Suppress Evidence 
 
A. Introduction 
At Renteria’s hearing on his suppression motion, the parties stipulated that the video 
recording of Renteria’s traffic stop be entered into evidence.  (See State’s Ex. 1; Tr., p.59, Ls.8-
18.)  Based on that video and the testimony of the witnesses, the district court found that Officer 
Sproat properly pulled over Renteria for failing to signal for the statutorily required period.  (Tr., 
p.164, L.24 – p.165, L.2.)  The officer made contact with Renteria and his passenger and, while 
they were looking through the car for their proof of insurance, the officer asked if they had drugs 
in the car.  (Tr., p.165, Ls.3-8.)  Once it became clear that Renteria did not have proof of 
insurance in the car, the officer returned to his patrol vehicle.  (Tr., p.165, Ls.9-11.)  While 
walking back to his car, the officer called for a canine unit.  (Tr., p.165, Ls.11-12.)  Once in his 
patrol vehicle, he immediately radioed dispatch with Renteria’s and his passenger’s names and 
birthdates to run a warrants check on both and a valid license check on Renteria.  (Tr., p.165, 
Ls.12-16.)   
At 7:15 into the video of the traffic stop, while Officer Sproat waited for a response from 
dispatch, a canine officer arrived with his drug-detection dog, Dax, and spoke with Officer 
Sproat.  (Tr., p.165, Ls.17-19.)  Dispatch had still not confirmed Renteria’s valid driving 
privileges or whether there were any active warrants for him or his passenger.  (Tr., p.165, Ls.19-
23.)  While Officer Sproat continued to wait on dispatch, the canine officer took Dax over to the 
pulled-over vehicle to conduct an open air sniff.  (Tr., p.165, L.24 – p.166, L.3.)  Dax’s initial 
alert on the vehicle occurred at 10:01 into the video of the stop, and the dog continued to alert on 
the vehicle through the time Officer Sproat received a call back from dispatch at 10:44, 
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informing him that they could not confirm the driver based on the information given.  (Tr., 
p.166, Ls.4-22.)  The officer gave dispatch Renteria’s license number and dispatch was 
ultimately able to verify his driving privileges and warrant status at about 10:55 into the traffic 
stop.  (Tr., p.166, L.22 – p.167, L.8.) 
Based on these facts, the district court determined as a matter of law that the traffic stop 
was not extended beyond what was necessary to complete the routine traffic investigation to 
facilitate the drug-detection dog’s open air sniff, and so denied Renteria’s suppression motion.  
(Tr., p.167, L.9 – p.168, L.1; R., p.202.)  On appeal, Renteria does not challenge the district 
court’s factual findings.  (Appellant’s brief, p.8.)  Instead, Renteria claims that the district court 
erred in its legal conclusions.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.8-12.)  Application of the correct legal 
standards to the facts found by the district court, however, shows no error. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
On review of a ruling on a motion to suppress, the appellate court accepts the trial court’s 
findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence and exercises free review of the trial 
court’s determination as to whether constitutional standards have been satisfied in light of the 
facts found.  State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482, 485-86, 211 P.3d 91, 94-95 (2009).  At a 
suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, 
weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court.  State v. Valdez-Molina, 
127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995). 
 
C. The Detention Of Renteria And Search Of His Vehicle Were Reasonable Under The 
Fourth Amendment 
 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that “[t]he right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
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and seizures, shall not be violated.”  U.S. Const. amend. IV.  While routine traffic stops by police 
officers implicate the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, the reasonableness of a traffic stop is analyzed under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), 
because a traffic stop is more similar to an investigative detention than a custodial arrest.  
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979); State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983, 88 P.3d 
1220, 1223 (Ct. App. 2003).  “An investigative detention is permissible if it is based upon 
specific articulable facts which justify suspicion that the detained person is, has been, or is about 
to be engaged in criminal activity.”  Sheldon, 139 Idaho at 983, 88 P.3d at 1223 (citing Terry, 
392 U.S. at 21; United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)). 
An investigative detention must not only be justified at its beginning, but must also be 
conducted in a manner that is reasonably related in scope and duration to the circumstances 
which justified the interference in the first place.  Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 499-500 
(1983); State v. Roe, 140 Idaho 176, 181, 90 P.3d 926, 931 (Ct. App. 2004).  “The purpose of a 
stop is not permanently fixed, however, at the moment the stop is initiated, for during the course 
of the detention there may evolve suspicion of criminality different from that which initially 
prompted the stop.”  Sheldon, 139 Idaho at 984, 88 P.3d at 1224.  Routine traffic stops may turn 
up suspicious circumstances which could justify an officer asking questions unrelated to the stop.  
State v. Myers, 118 Idaho 608, 613, 798 P.2d 453, 458 (Ct. App. 1990).  “The officer’s 
observations, general inquiries, and events succeeding the stop may—and often do—give rise to 
legitimate reasons for particular lines of inquiry and further investigation by an officer.”  Id. 
“[T]he tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop context is determined by 
the seizure’s ‘mission’—to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop and attend to 
related safety concerns.”  Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. ___, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 1614 (2015) 
 7 
(internal citation omitted).  Asking a driver questions about drugs and weapons is part of a 
reasonable investigation, even if that was not the purpose of the initial stop.  Rodriguez, 
135 S.Ct. at 1614-15; see also State v. Parkinson, 135 Idaho 357, 362-63, 17 P.3d 301, 306-07 
(Ct. App. 2000).  “The stop remains a reasonable seizure while the officer diligently pursues the 
purpose of the stop, to which that reasonable suspicion is related.  However, should the officer 
abandon the purpose of the stop, the officer no longer has that original reasonable suspicion 
supporting his actions.”  State v. Linze, 161 Idaho 605, 609, 389 P.3d 150, 154 (2016).  Officers 
may not prolong a traffic stop beyond the time reasonably necessary to complete their 
investigation, “absent the reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to justify detaining an 
individual.”  Rodriguez, 135 S.Ct. at 1614-15; see also State v. Brumfield, 136 Idaho 913, 916-
17, 42 P.3d 706, 709-10 (Ct. App. 2001). 
Warrantless searches are also “per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—
subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.”  Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).  One exception to the warrant requirement is the “automobile 
exception,” which allows warrantless searches of vehicles when there is probable cause to 
believe that the vehicle contains contraband or evidence of criminal activity.  See California v. 
Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 572 (1991); State v. Tucker, 132 Idaho 841, 842, 979 P.2d 1199, 1200 
(1999).  “Probable cause is established if the facts available to the officer at the time of the 
search would warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that the area or items to be 
searched contained contraband or evidence of a crime.”  State v. Yeoumans, 144 Idaho 871, 873, 
172 P.3d 1146, 1148 (Ct. App. 2007) (citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 823 (1982)). 
Law enforcement may deploy a drug-detection dog to sniff the exterior of a lawfully 
stopped vehicle without suspicion of drug activity so long as doing so does not prolong the 
-- --- ------------
-- --- ------------
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detention beyond what is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.  Illinois v. Caballes, 
543 U.S. 405 (2005); State v. Wigginton, 142 Idaho 180, 183-84, 125 P.3d 536, 539-40 (Ct. App. 
2005).  “When a reliable drug-detection dog indicates that a lawfully stopped automobile 
contains the odor of controlled substances, the officer has probable cause to believe that there are 
drugs in the automobile and may search it without a warrant.”  Yeoumans, 144 Idaho at 873, 
172 P.3d at 1148 (quoting State v. Gibson, 141 Idaho 227, 281, 108 P.3d 424, 428 (Ct. App. 
2005)).  “If probable cause justifies the search of a vehicle, then it justifies the search of every 
part of the vehicle and its contents which could conceal the object of the search.”  State v. 
Braendle, 134 Idaho 173, 175, 997 P.2d 634, 636 (Ct. App. 2000). 
Applying the correct legal standards to the facts before it, the district court determined 
that the traffic stop was consistent with Fourth Amendment standards and denied Renteria’s 
suppression Motion.  (Tr., p.167, L.9 – p.168, L.1.)  As noted above, the traffic stop was initiated 
based on reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation.  (Tr., p.50, L.8 – p.51, L.17; p.164, L.24 – 
p.165, L.2.)  Officer Sproat did not abandon his traffic investigation; he contacted dispatch as 
soon as he returned to his vehicle with the birthdates and names of Renteria and his passenger to 
run a records check.  (Tr., p.165, Ls.12-16.)  Finally, the drug dog’s alert, which occurred before 
dispatch called Officer Sproat back (let alone before the officer had finished his traffic citation) 
(Tr., p.165, L.17 – p.166, L.22), gave the officers probable cause to search the vehicle for drugs.  
See Yeoumans, 144 Idaho at 873, 172 P.3d at 1148.  There was no legal basis upon which to 
suppress the evidence. 
Renteria disputes this on appeal, asserting that three de minimus delays—(1) the officer 
asking Renteria and his passenger if they were transporting any drugs while they looked for their 
proof of insurance; (2) the officer requesting a drug-detection dog as he walked back to his patrol 
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car; and (3) the officer speaking briefly with the canine officer while he waited for dispatch to 
respond to his records check request—unreasonably extended the traffic stop.  (Appellant’s brief, 
pp.8-11.)  Renteria’s argument fails.  First, as noted above, an officer may ask questions about 
drugs and weapons, regardless of whether that was the purpose of the initial stop.  See 
Rodriguez, 135 S.Ct. at 1614-15; Parkinson, 135 Idaho at 362-63, 17 P.3d at 306-07.  And 
certainly asking such questions while Renteria tried to find his proof of insurance cannot be said 
to have delayed the traffic investigation.  Similarly, multitasking by requesting a drug-detection 
dog while walking back to the patrol car and speaking with the canine officer while waiting for 
dispatch to respond did not extend the traffic investigation.  
In the alternative, Renteria also argues that if the above “deviations” did not extend the 
stop, then searching in the trunk following the drug-detection dog’s alert did because, by that 
time, dispatch had responded and the stop should have been concluded with a citation for the 
lack of insurance.  (Appellant’s brief, p.11.)  This argument is equally unavailing.  If officers 
acquire during the course of a traffic investigation reasonable suspicion of other crimes, they 
may investigate those crimes.  See Rodriguez, 135 S.Ct. at 1614-15; Sheldon, 139 Idaho at 984, 
88 P.3d at 1224.  A drug-detection dog’s alert gives officers probable cause to search for drugs.  
Yeoumans, 144 Idaho at 873, 172 P.3d at 1148.  And where “probable cause justifies the search 
of a vehicle, … it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents which could 
conceal the object of the search.”  Braendle, 134 Idaho at 175, 997 P.2d at 636. 
Renteria has shown no basis for suppressing the evidence properly acquired during his 
traffic stop.  The officers’ actions during that traffic stop complied with the Fourth Amendment 
and state laws.  The district court applied the correct legal standards to the facts and denied 
Renteria’s suppression motion.  Renteria has shown no error in the district court’s denial of that 
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motion.  The order of the district court denying Renteria’s suppression motion should therefore 
be affirmed. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s order denying 
Renteria’s suppression motion. 
 DATED this 22nd day of September, 2017. 
 
 
 
      _/s/ Russell J. Spencer_____________ 
      RUSSELL J. SPENCER 
      Deputy Attorney General 
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